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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

7 November 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Consequences of the acceptance of a "Package Deal" for
Admission of New Member States to the UN.

1. Terms of the Proposal - The "package deal" which has been referred to in the Lodge-Kuznetsov conversations is one broadly along the lines of a proposal which the USSR has advocated for some years and which the US has hitherto rejected on the ground that qualification for UN membership should be separately determined in each case. In exchange for agreement to the USSR's demand for admission of four satellite states -- Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania -- the USSR would agree to the admission of thirteen states sponsored by the US and other members. These thirteen would be Italy, Japan, and Spain; Austria, Eire, Finland, and Portugal; Cambodia, Ceylon, Jordan, Laos, Libya, and Nepal. It is understood that the USSR may also demand the admission of the so-called Mongolian Peoples Republic, but in discussing below the consequences of the "package deal" this possible feature of it is left out of account on the ground that it is not likely to be of major significance.

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NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☐

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General Effect on Free World Attitudes

2. Toward the US - It seems likely that in the non-Communist world generally the change in the US position will be greeted with approval. This will be particularly true, of course, within the thirteen states to be admitted to the UN, since for them denial of membership, for whatever causes, has been a mark of second-class status and many of them have been pressing for admission. Particularly in countries like Italy and Japan, as well as in the smaller European states among the thirteen, where a broader public opinion is involved in government attitudes, there is likely to be a wholly favorable response to the US move. Elsewhere the US action is likely to be taken in the main as evidence of a desirable flexibility in US policy and of a genuine effort to contribute to a relaxation of cold war tensions.

3. Toward the East-West Conflict - The general feeling in the non-Communist world that events are moving toward East-West detente is likely to be reinforced by such a development. If the move takes place concurrently with the Four Power meeting of foreign ministers, it will be regarded as a fruit of that meeting, and the intransigence

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of the USSR on the main issues under discussion there will tend to be obscured. Thus a new stimulus to hope in "the spirit of Geneva" will be given, and this is likely to have some effect in a further decline in free world awareness of the Communist danger. On the whole, however, it is not likely to arouse any exaggerated hopes, as would settlement of some major issue at Geneva, since for the most part the issue of UN membership is probably regarded as a technical one and not as a major East-West difference.

Effects in the European Satellites

4. The effect on popular attitudes within the Satellites is difficult to estimate with precision because knowledge of the hopes and expectations of the Satellite peoples is tenuous. Insofar as hopes remain for early liberation, a move to legitimize the regimes as members of the UN community would tend to diminish such hopes. The impression that a gradual easing of East-West tensions was taking place in the wake of the Summit conference has apparently already had such an effect. It is not clear, however, that opinion in the Satellites has hoped for liberation if the price was to be the risks and dangers of general war. Probably there has been an irrational hope that somehow US pressure would effect Soviet withdrawal without war. In

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any case, the impression of a growing detente would probably add to discouragement on the part of present dissident elements. Insofar as dissidence has been fed by hopes placed in the US, there may thus be some further relapse into resignation.

5. On the other hand, we do not believe that admission of the Satellite states to the UN would be regarded as an event of such consequence as to encourage an attitude of positive acceptance and accommodation toward these regimes. Dissidence and resistance depend much more upon the concrete daily experience of these regimes' exactions, injustices, and frustrations of national feeling than upon foreign attitudes toward the regimes. It is possible, moreover, that a skillful presentation of US motives in accepting the admission of these regimes could do much to counter negative interpretations of the US action.

Effects in Asia

6. One of the principal inferences that seems certain to be drawn from the US action is that the US intends sooner or later to accept the admission of Communist China to the UN also. Consequently, the US will probably find it increasingly difficult to maintain its case

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against Chinese Communist admission. Many Asian states would probably welcome the US move on this ground alone, since they favor Communist China's admission, and believe that such admission would reduce the danger of a conflict between the US and China.

Implications for Soviet Propaganda

7. We do not believe that there would be any serious propaganda advantage to the USSR as a result of the US action. The USSR would regard US acceptance of a position the USSR has long upheld as a "victory" and would handle it in Soviet propaganda as evidence that US policy has been obliged to respond to the world-wide demand of the peoples for positive steps toward peace. The more important considerations the Soviet leaders would probably have in mind in entering upon the "package deal" would be: (a) to keep the "spirit of Geneva" alive as a propaganda theme, particularly at a moment when it is wearing thin in view of Soviet actions in the Middle East and the stalemate at Geneva; (b) to obtain a more favorable basis for agitation of the issue of Communist China's admission to the UN; (c) to gain wider acceptance within the Satellites and in European opinion generally for the idea of the permanence and legitimacy of those regimes.

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FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:

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